Do a diagnostic
test to learn
your own Tacit Knowledge!
© Karl E. Sveiby Dec 31
1997 All rights reserved.
Also recommended: Transfer
of Knowledge in the Information Processing Professions European Management
Journal 1996.
Action
Oriented Knowledge
Knowledge
is a Tool with Rules
Skill, Know-how, Expertise and Competence
Intellective
and Agentive Doing
Human knowledge articulated
through language is essentially metaphoric in character. "Knowledge about
knowledge" is therefore a question of which metaphors one chooses to
express one´s knowledge in.
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976)
was a Hungarian medical scientist whose research was mainly done in physical
chemistry before he turned into philosophy at the age of 55. He accepted a
personal chair in social studies at the
Tacit Knowledge is of
particular interest for those who are interested in how to manage Knowledge
Oragnizations or
those involved in Intellectual Capital.
The concept also explains
some of the paradoxes on the Information Markets. Michael Polanyi called his book Personal
Knowledge because he wanted to underline that the intellect also in science
is connected with a "passionate" contribution of the person knowing. Emotions
are a vital component of the person`s knowledge. But this does not make our
understanding subjective.
Knowing is objective in
the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality.
Polanyi`s concept of
knowledge is based on three main theses: First, true discovery, cannot be
accounted for by a set of articulated rules or algorithms. Second, knowledge is
public and also to a very great extent personal (i.e. it is constructed by
humans and therefore contains emotions, "passion".). Third, the
knowledge that underlies the explicit knowledge is more fundamental; all
knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.
Knowledge is thus not
private but social. Socially conveyed knowledge blends with the experience of
reality of the individual.
Both Quantum Mechanics
and the theory of relativity are very difficult to understand; it takes only a
few minutes to memorize the facts accounted for by relativity, but years of
study may not suffice to master the theory and see these facts in its context. At
all (these) points the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal
coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the
disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity.
New experiences are always
assimilated through the concepts that the individual disposes and which the
individual has inherited from other users of the language. Those concepts are
tacitly based. All our knowledge therefore rests in a tacit dimension.
When we are tacitly
involved in a process-of-knowing we act without distance. This describes how
and why we take things "for granted". The individual changes,
"adapts", the concepts in the light of experiences and reinterpret
the language used. When new words or concepts are brought into an older system
of language, both affect each other. The system itself enriches what the
individual has brought into it.
In each activity, there are
two different levels or dimensions of knowledge, which are mutually exclusive:
Knowledge about the object or phenomenon that is in focus - focal knowledge.
Knowledge that is used as a tool to handle or improve what is in focus - tacit
knowledge.
The focal and tacit
dimensions are complementary. The tacit knowledge functions as a background
knowledge which assists in accomplishing a task which is in focus. That which
is tacit varies from one situation to another. For instance, when reading a
text, words and linguistic rules function as tacit subsidiary knowledge while
the attention of the reader is focused on the meaning of the text.
Inspired by Gestalt
Psychology, Polanyi regards the process of knowing as fragmentary clues,
senso-motoric or from memory, which are integrated under categories. We make
sense of reality by categorising it. The patterns of categories contain,
theories, methods, feelings, values and skills which can be used in a fashion
that the tradition judges are valid. We attend from the particulars to the
focus upon which they bear. This act of integration is an informal act of the
mind and can not be replaced by a formal operation.
This integration of
knowledge is a personal skill in itself and can not be disposed of. A special
kind of meta knowledge is required for integration; knowledge about knowledge
as integrated. It is possible to have this meta-knowledge without knowing its
details.
Polanyi`s theory is about
how human beings acquire and use knowledge, it is action oriented and about the
process of knowing. In his earlier works he frequently uses the verb
"knowing" and the noun "knowledge" as synonyms. In his
later works (Tacit Knowing) he emphasises the dynamic properties, i.e. the
verb:
Knowledge is an activity
which would be better described as a process of knowing. Polanyi thus regards knowledge as
both static "knowledge" and dynamic "knowing". When the
dynamic properties are emphasised, He uses verbs like knowing or learning. The
dynamic properties describe how human beings strive for acquiring, coming to
know, new knowledge.
Subsidiary awareness and
focal awareness are mutually exclusive. If a pianist shifts the attention from
the piece he is paying to the observation of what he is doing with his fingers
while playing it he gets confused and may have to stop.
When I read an article or
book I am vividly aware of the meaning conveyed by the text, still I may know
none of its words. I have attended to the words but only for what they mean to
me and not as the objects they are. The message of a letter is therefore
remembered even after the symbols of the text is forgotten. I might not even
remember what language it was written, if I know several languages.
Polanyi emphasises that the
human being is knowing all the time, we are switching between tacit knowing and
focal knowing every second of our lives, it is a basic human ability to blend
the old and well-known with the new and unforeseen, otherwise we would not be
able to live in the world.
Polanyi also sometimes
describes knowledge as an object that can be articulated in words. When tacit
knowledge is made explicit through language it can be focused for reflection.
The process of
articulation has rendered immense effective assistance to our native mnemonic
powers. Man is not much superior to a rat in finding his way in a maze; and it
is not clear that he possesses much greater native intelligence than the animal
for reorganizing remembered experiences. But the bare unaided memory of animals
can only collect scraps of Information, unsystematically; nor could man do much
better but for the power of systematization dependent on speech. Not until the
invention of printing enormously speeded up the reproduction of records could
descriptive zoology and botany expand from the Aristotelian and medieval history
covering a few hundred types to a systematic science comprising millions of
species. (About drawings)Articulation pictures the essentials of a situation on
a reduced scale which lends itself more easily to imaginative manipulation than
the ungainly original; it thereby makes possible a science of engineering.
But words convey nothing
except a previously acquired meaning which may be somewhat modified by their
present use, but will not as a rule have been first discovered on this
occasion. Our knowledge of the things denoted by words will have been largely
acquired by experience in the same way as animals come to know things, while
the words will have acquired their meaning by previously designating such
experience, either when uttered by others in our presence or when used by
ourselves.
Therefore when I receive
Information by reading a letter and when I ponder the message of the letter I am
subsidiarily aware not only of its text, but also of all the past occasions by
which I have come to understand the words of the text, and the whole range of
this subsidiary awareness is presented focally in terms of the message. This
message or meaning on which attention is now focused is not something tangible;
it is the conception evoked by the text. The conception in question is the
focus of our attention in terms of which we attend subsidiary both to the text
and to the objects indicated by the text. Thus the meaning of a text resides in
a focal comprehension of all the relevant instrumentally known particulars,
just as the purpose of an action resides instrumentally used particulars.
By distancing the actor
from the knowledge and articulate it in language or symbols, the knowledge
becomes possible to distribute, criticise and thereby increase.
Polanyi`s emphasis on the
dynamic properties makes articulate propositionary knowledge (facts) -
metaphorically speaking - only the top of the iceberg.
Because we can know more
than we can tell it follows that what has been made articulate and formalised
is in some degree underdetermined by that of which we know tacitly. Language
alone is not enough for making knowledge explicit.
While the correct use of
medical terms cannot be achieved in itself, without the knowledge of medicine a
great deal of medicine can be remembered even after on has forgotten the use of
medical terms.
All articulated
propositionary knowledge has originally been constructed in someone`s mind, be
it in my own or somebody else`s. Facts are thus personal, not objective in a positivistic
scientific sense. Facts can be tested for their truth content by an act of
assertion but the act of assertion contains a tacit part too.
Polanyi also emphasises the
functional aspect of knowledge, i.e. he regards knowledge as a tool by which we
either act or gather new knowledge. This tool is unreflected knowledge that we
take for granted in a situation.
When we use a hammer to
drive a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in a different way....The
difference may be stated by saying that the latter (hammer) are not, like the
nail, objects of our attention, but instruments of it. They are not watched in
themselves; we watch something else while keeping intensely aware of them. I
have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in my palm of my hand which is
merged into my focal awareness of my driving the nail.
Whether an object is a tool
or not depends on the actor's attitude. If a stone is used as a hammer it is a
physical tool. Methods, rules, beliefs and theories are intellectual tools.
Polanyi uses the notion of rules. A "rule" is tied to the
result of an action. The knowledge of the rules also functions as a tacit
knowledge, i.e. a kind of tacit "tool of tools".
A rule is a standard for
correctness, a norm. The difference is that the norm is entirely static whereas
a rule can be changed. The rules develop in the process of knowing or come from
tradition. Mastery of the rules also brings with it the ability to change them
or extend them. Rules are generally tacit but they may be articulated into
explicit rules-of-thumb, maxims.
When the static properties
are emphasised, Polanyi thus use nouns like knowledge, or emphasise the
function of knowledge, tools or criteria for standards like rule or value. The
static dimension describes the functional properties of knowledge; how
knowledge as an object can be used in various contexts. The nouns however need
the dynamic verbs for describing how new knowledge is acquired, created or made
obsolete.
Polanyi maintains that
craftsmen, "makers", use the same kind of methods as other
practitioners "doers". They both follow rules and exemplars and they
rely on experience for making judgements in their work just like scientists
have to do in their work. Polanyi makes no clear distinction between practical
knowledge and other kinds of knowledge, like theoretical propositionary
knowledge. Polanyi therefore makes no difference in principle between the
analytical skills of a Bertrand Russel or the blind man`s rod. The
process-of-knowing is the same.
The medical
diagnostician's skill is as much an art of doing as it is an art of knowing.
Intellectual tools are
however different from physical tools in that they are based in a social
context. A person needs to be confident in that social context in order to be
able to use intellectual tools. It is an important distinction as regards the
rules and the tools.
The scientist`s and the
professional`s tools and rules are more intellective than the craftsman`s or the
practitioner`s more agentive tools and rules. This distinction is important
to add to Polanyi because intellective tools are a main feature of professions
involved in Information processing. One important feature is that
experts working with physical tools can detach themselves from their tools. Intellective
tools can not be disposed of that easily.
A common notion is that
thinking is not doing and a common distinction is made between
"thinkers" and "doers". A more appropriate distinction is
between agentive and intellective doing. To focus one`s thoughts as in
writing an article can be seen as an intellective act, thus =
"intellective doing". To move one`s body or to "get things
going" through other people can be seen as an agentive act, "agentive
doing".
If one regards the dynamic
properties of knowledge the most material, the notion Process-of-Knowing
probably gives a better description than the word "knowledge". Bertil
Rolf suggests in his book Profession, Tradition och Tyst Kunskap (1991)
a hierarchy of knowing based on how the rules are followed: The lowest level of
knowing is to follow rules which can be controlled by the subject itself, Skill
The next level is to follow rules which are established by a social context
outside the individual, Know-How The highest level is to be able to (and
be allowed to) change the rules, competence or perhaps better in
contemporary English expertise. Each level contains both tacit and focal
knowing.
Skill is the ability to act according to
rules which depend on feedback from a non-social environment. Polanyi: Skills
combine muscular acts which are not identifiable, according to relations that
we cannot define. Skills might be the ability to chop wood or type on a
typewriter. The actor him/herself is able to judge whether the action has been
successful or not.
Know-how includes skill and is the ability
to act in social contexts. Other actors, like a professional institution or the
tradition (the fourth level) establish the rules. Know-how implies problem
solving. The ability of reflection on the rules, however, is of a higher order
and should not be a part of skill or know-how. The British philosopher Gilbert
Ryle (1949) points out that the boxer or the surgeon or the poet all apply
their special criteria when they accomplish their special tasks. And they are
regarded (by others) as good or bad or creative - not because of their ability
to reflect over what they are doing but because of the result of their
performance. The label "Know-how" has been used by many authors, Ryle
probably being one of the first. Polanyi seems very close to Ryle`s concept
Knowing-How but in fact he argues against Ryle. Ryle`s knowing-how does not
imply a subsidiary awareness as Polanyi`s tacit knowing does. Polanyi does not
use the label at all, probably because he argues against his contemporary Ryle.
The Know-How label might thus lead to unfortunate confusion.
Expertise is know-how + the ability of
reflection. Expertise orCompetence in Polanyi`s
sense implies the ability of know-how within a certain domain and the ability
not only to submit to the rules but also by reflection influence the rules of
the domain or the tradition. Expertise is thus not a property but a relation
between individual actors and a social system of rules. A person is an expert
within a tradition: In a competent mental act the agent does not do as he
pleases, but compels himself forcibly to act as he believes he must.
Polanyi also makes an
illustration of incompetence: We draw here a distinction between two
kinds of error, namely scientific guesses which have turned out to be mistaken,
and unscientific guesses which are not only false but incompetent.
An individual is thus not
competent per se, rather it is the individual in a role and in a context who is
competent or not. In order to change the rules a competent individual needs a
social or interpersonal communicative knowledge in addition to know-how. It is
the expertise of mastering the rules of the profession so well that they no
longer need to be obeyed. A characteristic of expertise compared to know-how
and skill is that the actor has power over his own knowledge, i.e. over the
rule system which decides quality standards. Only when an individual has this
kind of power is the system in the position to learn from the experience of the
individual.
Knowing can be both tacit
and focal. It depends on the situation whether it is used tacitly or being
focused and/or as articulated knowledge. Tacit and focal are not categories or
levels in a hierarchy but are more like two dimensions of the same knowledge. Skills
which are very difficult to articulate and to transfer between individuals thus
have a large proportion tacit knowing, whereas a competent person must be able
to focus more of his/her tacit process-of-knowing in order to articulate and
communicate in a social context.
As I suggest in this Paper,
work also has an Intellective and Agentive Knowing dimension. Agentive knowing
is more oriented towards using the body as a tool whereas intellective
process-of-knowing is oriented towards using the mind as a tool. Agentive
skills are therefore more emotional and body oriented than intellective skills.
Intellective abilities tend to be more analytical. Agentive skills are more
oriented towards the syntetical. The distinction is made because these two
dimensions are important in the Information processing professions and in
organisations employing mainly professionals. It is not possible to be too
distinct, however, since knowing includes always usage of both mind and body. The
border between the two is thus fuzzy. One might see the categorisation as a
family of abilities with biases towards one of the two categories.
. One of the central
concepts in Polanyi`s concept of knowledge is tradition. Tradition
describes how knowledge is transferred in a social context. The tradition is a
system of values outside the individual. Both language and tradition are social
systems which take up, store and convey the knowledge of society. "Personal"
knowledge is thus not the same as subjective opinions. It is more like the
knowledge of a judge who within the framework of the law and praxis (=
tradition) gives a judicial decision based on his judgement in a particular
situation. Another judge should in principle be able to take the same decision.
An art which cannot be
specified in detail cannot be transmitted by prescription, since no
prescription for it exists. It can be passed on only by example from master to
apprentice. This restricts the range of diffusion to that of personal contacts.
We find accordingly that craftsmanship tends to survive in closely
circumscribed local traditions. While the articulate contents of science are
successfully taught all over the world in hundreds of new universities, the
unspecifiable art of scientific research has not yet penetrated many of these.
To learn by example is
to submit to authority. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the
presence of his example the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the
art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. A
society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to
tradition.
Polanyi is mainly
interested in transfer of a process-of-knowing from one person to another(s)
and he identifies three tacit psycho-social mechanisms for this: Imitation,
identification and learning-by-doing. They are mechanisms for direct
knowledge transfer. Facts, rules and exemplars are transferred without
intermediate storage in a medium. The term I use - Knowledge
"transfer" - is therefore not quite appropriate, since knowledge is
not moved as goods. The "receiver" reconstructs his/her version of
the "supplier`s" knowledge.
A tradition transfers its
patterns of action, rules, values and norms. They create a social order because
people can foresee both the action of others and the implied expectations on
themselves. The tradition also tells what attitudes one should take. The
individual defines him/herself as someone by submitting to the tradition. The
formation of knowledge within a tradition is done both locally (by
master/apprenticeships) and in a larger context through professional bodies.
Values are not subjective but part of a
professional tradition outside the individual self. In the value an
individual's experience is integrated with a claim of being general within the
tradition of a profession. Personal knowledge contains elements from how
reality is perceived by the tradition. The individual lets the lingual forms
and cultural patterns of the tradition form his own idiosyncrasies into an
image of reality, irrespective of whether his tools are patterns of thought,
patterns of action or social institutions. As time passes, some of the values
are validated and transformed cognitively into beliefs about how things are. They
are therefore no longer in need of being tested so they become a
taken-for-granted tacit knowledge shared by the members of the group.
Even if Polanyi does not
discuss this particular aspect one might use his concept for identifying
traditions of a particular industry, organisation or department, the latter
being the "tradition within the organisation".
There is an important
distinction between organisation and tradition. Tradition is a dynamic unarticulated
process by which a process-of-knowing is transferred between individuals, it
has no purpose, no written rules and no power centre. Tradition exists
independent of organisation boundaries.
Polanyi`s notion of
tradition is based on the psycho-social context of scientific professions,
which have procedures for enforcing compliance of unwritten rules. He therefore
sees the older professional as having authority over the younger (= socially
sanctioned knowledge). The apprentice lacks the ability to question what he
learns, tradition thus implies submission. In addition credibility, trust and
confidence are necessary. Credibility carries the social exchange of views
between equal individuals within a tradition.
Tradition of knowing thus
takes place only if the combination of legitimacy (on behalf of the sender) and
trust (receiver) exists. When the relation between master and apprentice is
shifted to the ideals nurtured by the tradition the apprentice becomes
liberated.
I distinguish some
limitations in Polanyi`s concept of tradition of knowledge: Polanyi seems to
regard tradition as a process in which the master is always the older. This
notion fit most profession fairly well until the 1970s. It does not fit fast
moving computer professions like computer programming very well.
Tacit knowing and tradition
function as a taken-for-granted knowledge, which in its turn delimits the
process-of-knowing and sets boundaries for learning. Polanyi does not
problematise this aspect.
Polanyi does not
distinguish the implications of the difference between interactive knowledge
transfer (as in a tradition) direct from individual to individual and indirect
knowledge transfer via a medium like information. Organisations involved in
production and selling of information rely on more indirect vehicles like
massmedia, manuals, books, or computer programs. Articulated rules (maxims) for guiding behaviour like texts in manuals or
accounting procedures, check lists, handbooks, guidelines for salesmen etc. are
also examples of indirect knowledge transfer.
Email: karl-erik@sveiby.com